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Abstract
We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence
of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each agent can participate with at
most one principal, and principal-agents corporations are isolated. We analyze the role of
standard incentive compatible mechanisms in these contexts. First, we provide a clarifying
example showing how incentive compatible mechanisms fail to completely characterize
equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that
truth-telling equilibria are robust against unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
We study competing mechanism games of incomplete information in which competition is ex-
clusive: contracts incorporate exclusivity clauses and they are fully enforced. Thus, upon ob-
serving her private information and the publicly observable mechanisms, each agent chooses to
participate with at most one principal. Given all participation decisions, each principal-agents
corporation is isolated: the payoff to any member of a given corporation does not depend on any
decision taken outside the corporation. Final allocations are determined by the contracts that
principals independently sign with agents.
Exclusive competition is at the hearth of most theoretical analyses of markets in which agents
hold some private information. This assumption plays a fundamental role in competitive screen-
ing (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)), competitive search (Guerrieri et al. (2010)) and competing
auctions (McAfee (1993)) models, among many others. At the same time, letting firms compete
over exclusive contracts is regarded a convenient way to represent full observability of agents’
trades in the extension of general equilibrium theory to private information economies (Prescott
and Townsend (1984), Bisin and Gottardi (2006)).
Despite the prominent role of these economic applications, we still lack a general charac-
terization of equilibrium mechanisms in exclusive competition settings. Indeed, the approaches
above share the restriction to standard incentive compatible mechanisms: principals commit to
incentive schemes such that each agent finds it optimal to truthfully report her private infor-
mation to the principal she negotiates with, as long as the others do so. However, few, if any,
theoretical arguments have been developed to support this choice. If competition is exclusive, to
what extent one can safely restrict attention to incentive compatible mechanisms? The present
paper contributes to answer this question. Specifically, we analyze the role of the incentive com-
patible mechanisms introduced in the traditional, single-principal, mechanism design (Myerson
(1979) and Myerson (1982)) in competing mechanism games under exclusive competition. We
provide two main results.
First, we show that the restriction to incentive compatible mechanisms involves a loss of
generality. Indeed, we exhibit a pure strategy equilibrium outcome of a game in which princi-
pals post indirect mechanisms that cannot be reproduced by incentive compatible ones. This is
supported by agents’ randomizing over messages and participation following every principal’s
deviation, given the indirect mechanisms posted by his competitors. All such randomizations
serve the role of threats for principals. It turns out that incentive compatible mechanisms are not
rich enough to reproduce the same threats and at least one principal can profitably deviate. The
result suggests that standard models of exclusive competition may fail to provide a full char-
acterization of equilibrium outcomes. This failure, however, only arises with multiple agents.
In the particular case in which principals compete for a single agent, we show that incentive
compatible mechanisms retain full power if the way in which the agent breaks her ties is prop-
erly considered. Every equilibrium outcome which survives to principals’ unilateral deviations,
irrespective of the continuation equilibrium selected by the agent, can also be characterized by
incentive compatible mechanisms. Although being demanding, this restriction is tight as we
illustrate by means of an example.
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Second, we investigate whether an equilibrium outcome supported by incentive compatible
mechanisms survives if a principal is allowed to deviate to general mechanisms. This amounts
to analyze the implications of enlarging the strategy space of a single principal, holding fixed
the behavior of his rivals. We show that any pure strategy equilibrium in which agents truthfully
report their private information survives if a principal deviates to any indirect mechanism. This
provides a rationale for the restriction to standard incentive compatible mechanisms postulated
in economic models of exclusive competition.
1.1 Incentive compatibility and exclusive competition: an overview
We analyze competing mechanism games of incomplete information in which agents can par-
ticipate with at most one principal and their preferences are such that, given participation de-
cisions, each principal-agents corporation is isolated. If competition is non-exclusive, several
game-theoretic examples1 show that incentive compatible mechanisms may fail to provide a full
characterization of equilibrium outcomes. The result, however, crucially exploits the fact that
each agent participates with many principals at a time. If agents can participate with at most one
principal, a potential loss of generality associated to incentive compatible mechanisms is docu-
mented in the literature on competition between principal-agents corporations, building on the
original example in Myerson (1982). This literature models situations in which, although each
agent is restricted to be part of only one corporation, competition is affected by an externality
between corporations: the payoff to an agent of a given corporation is determined by market
conditions, which depend on the behavior of all agents, including those belonging to the other
corporations.2 Martimort (1996) is the first to show how this externality can be responsible for
a failure of incentive compatible mechanisms to be a general characterization device. A similar
insight, though in a more abstract setting, is provided by Epstein and Peters (1999) who con-
struct equilibria in which principals correlate agents’ decisions through messages in a way that
cannot be reproduced by incentive compatible mechanisms.3 To achieve the correlation, they
exploit the assumption that agents in one corporation send non-trivial messages to the principals
of other corporations. In the absence of these externalities, are incentive compatible mechanisms
restrictive? We show the existence of equilibrium outcomes that cannot be supported by such
mechanisms even if every player’s payoff is only affected by the decisions of the members of
her corporation. Such a failure of the revelation principle may be relevant in the light of strate-
gic analyses of markets with incomplete information as discussed in Section 2.2. If principals
compete for a single agent, intuition suggests that one can follow the general logic in Myerson
(1982) and rely on incentive compatible mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to provide a formal proof of this result.
1See, for instance, Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002).
2See, for example, the analysis of competition among manufacturers when their retailers are privately informed
of market conditions. In these contexts, different works investigate the link between pre-commitment effects and
renegotiation (Caillaud et al. (1995)), the rationale behind alternative forms of vertical restraints (Gal-Or (1991)), the
welfare implications of information sharing (Pagnozzi and Piccolo (2013)). See Rey and Vergé (2008) for a survey
of recent results.
3See Appendix A in Epstein and Peters (1999).
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Another key issue for equilibrium characterization is whether incentive compatible mecha-
nisms may allow to characterize any best reply of a single principal to a given profile of mecha-
nisms posted by his opponents. In a framework of exclusive competition and many agents, Peck
(1997) exhibits a negative result. Given the mixed strategy of one principal, his opponent can
post a mechanism inducing a continuation equilibrium which cannot be reproduced by requiring
that agents behave truthfully. This suggests that incentive compatible mechanisms may fail to
characterize some of the principals’ best replies. We identify a role for these mechanisms under
exclusive competition.4 Indeed, our Proposition 1 shows that truth-telling equilibria in which
principals play pure strategies are robust to deviations towards indirect mechanisms. This in
turn clarifies that Peck (1997)’s result fundamentally relies on principals playing mixed strate-
gies. More generally, throughout the paper, and in line with standard approaches to competing
mechanism games, principals are not allowed to condition their mechanisms on those of their
competitors. The recent work of Szentes (2015) is one of the first attempts to analyze the impli-
cations of allowing for contractible contracts in exclusive competition settings. He shows that
equilibrium outcomes supported by “non contingent" mechanisms are robust to the introduction
of contingent contracts, although the latter typically induce equilibrium indeterminacy. In the
light of his first result, one could therefore reinterpret our Proposition 1 to argue that truth-telling
equilibria provide a useful reference point also under very general contracting assumptions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a general model of competing mech-
anisms under exclusive competition and illustrates its main economic applications. Section 3
analyzes the multiple agent setting, and Section 4 the single agent one.
2 The model
2.1 Competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
We refer to a scenario in which several principals (indexed by j ∈ J = {1, . . . ,J}) contract with
several agents (indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}). Each agent i has private information about her
type ωi ∈Ωi and ω= {ω1, · · · ,ωI} ∈Ω= ×
i∈I
Ωi is the array of agents’ types, which is a random
variable with distribution F .
Each principal j may choose an action x j ∈ X j. Agents only take participation decisions,
with aij ∈ {Y,N} being the decision of agent i to participate with principal j, in which {N}
stands for not participating. We take v j : X ×A×Ω→R+ and ui : X ×A×Ω→R+ to be the
payoff to principal j and to agent i, respectively, with X = ×
j∈J
X j and A= ×
i∈I
Ai. For a given array
of agents’ types ω, of actions a=
(
a1,a2, . . . ,aI
)
and of principals’ decisions x= (x1,x2, . . . ,xJ),
the payoffs to agent i and to principal j are ui (x,a,ω) and v j (x,a,ω), respectively.
Each principal perfectly observes the set of agents who participate with him. Communi-
cation is one-sided: each agent i may send a private message mij ∈ Mij to principal j. We let
4Under non-exclusive competition, Han (2007), Attar et al. (2010) and Attar et al. (2013) show that this result
requires demanding sufficient conditions. In particular, under incomplete information, Attar et al. (2013) show that
equilibria supported by incentive compatible mechanisms do not satisfy such a robustness requirement, in general.
They therefore introduce a class of two-sided communication mechanisms to obtain a characterization of principals’
best replies.
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each set Mij be sufficiently rich to include the element { /0} corresponding to the information
"agent i does not communicate with principal j", and to satisfy the standard size restriction
]Mij > ]Ωi for every i and j. Principal j takes his decisions contingent on the array of messages
m j he receives, with m j =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , . . . ,m
I
j
)
∈ M j = ×
i∈I
Mij, and on the participation choices
of the agents. Formally, we say that a mechanism proposed by principal j is the measurable
mapping γ j : M j×{Y,N}]I → ∆(X j). We take Γ j to be the set of mechanisms available to prin-
cipal j and denote Γ = ×
j∈J
Γ j. All relevant sets are taken to be compact and measurable with
respect to the topology of weak convergence. The competing mechanism game relative to Γ
begins when principals publicly and simultaneously commit to mechanisms. Given the posted
mechanisms (γ1,γ2, . . . ,γJ) ∈ Γ and their privately observed types, agents simultaneously take
a participation and a communication decision with respect to every principal. In this incom-
plete information game, a (mixed) strategy for principal j is a randomization δ j ∈ ∆(Γ j), and
δ= (δ1, · · · ,δJ) ∈ ∆(Γ) is a profile of mixed strategies for principals.
In line with economic applications, we model exclusive competition as a restriction on
agents’ preferences and on their strategy spaces. If competition is exclusive, for a given partici-
pation choice, the payoff to any agent i who participates with some principal j does not depend
on the decisions of the principals she is not participating with, nor on the agents’ participations
with principal j’s opponents. That is, agents’ preferences satisfy the following:
Assumption S-u Let I j = {i ∈ I : aij = Y}. For every j ∈ J , ω ∈Ω, h ∈ I j, x j ∈ X j and I j:
uh (x j,x− j,a,ω) = uh
(
x j,x ′− j,a
′,ω
)
,
for each x− j,x ′− j ∈ X− j and for each a, a′ ∈ A such that aij = ai′j = Y for every i ∈ I j.
A strategy for each agent i associates to every profile of posted mechanisms a joint par-
ticipation and communication decision. In a pure strategy, every agent participates with at
most one principal and sends a non-degenerate message only to the principal she participates
with. We let Si =
{
si ∈Mi×Ai : mij = /0 iff aij = {N}
}
be the strategy set for agent i, with
Ai =
{
ai =
(
ai1, . . . ,a
i
J
) ∈ {Y,N}]J : aij = {Y} for at most one j} and Mi = ×
j∈J
Mij representing
the sets of participation and communication decision, respectively. A strategy for agent i is then
the measurable mapping λi : Γ×Ωi→ ∆(Si). Every λ = (λ1,λ2, . . . ,λI) induces a probability
distribution over principals’ decisions. Given γ = (γ1,γ2, . . . ,γJ), we let βλj ∈ ∆(X j) be the dis-
tribution over principal j’s decisions induced by λ, and let βλ = ×
j∈J
βλj . The expected payoff to
each type ωi of agent i is:
U i
(
γ,λ,ωi
)
=
∫
Ω−i
∫
X
ui
(
x,a,ωi,ω−i
)
F
(
ω−i|ωi) dβλ dω−i,
with F
(
ω−i|ωi) being the conditional probability of ω−i given ωi. The expected payoff to
principal j when he plays δ j against his opponents’ strategies δ− j is:
Vj (δ j,δ− j,λ) =
∫
Γ j
∫
Γ− j
∫
Ω
∫
X
v j (x,a,ω) F (ω) dβλ dω dδ− j(γ− j) dδ j(γ j).
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The strategies (δ,λ) constitute an equilibrium relative to ∆(Γ) if λ is a continuation equilibrium
for every γ in the support of δ and if, given δ− j and λ, for every j∈ J : δ j ∈ argmax
δ′j∈∆(Γ j)
Vj
(
δ′j,δ− j,λ
)
.
A mechanism available to principal j is direct if agents can only communicate their types
to principal j, i.e. if Mij = Ωi ∪{ /0} for every i, with { /0} representing no communication. We
denote a direct mechanism for principal j as γ˜ j : ×
i∈I
(
Ωi∪{ /0})×{Y,N}]I → ∆(X j) and the
set of direct mechanisms as ΓDj ⊆ Γ j. We let GΓ be the competing mechanism game induced
by a given Γ, and GD the game in which principals are restricted to direct mechanisms. As in
Myerson (1982), a direct mechanism is incentive compatible from the point of view of principal
j if, given the mechanisms offered by the other principals, it induces a continuation equilibrium
in which agents truthfully reveal their types to him. A direct mechanism γ˜ j can therefore be
incentive compatible for a given array γ˜− j, but not for some other γ˜ ′− j 6= γ˜− j. An equilibrium
is truth-telling if every principal posts an incentive compatible mechanism and agents truthfully
reveal their private information to the principals they participate with, whenever this constitutes
an equilibrium in their continuation game.
2.2 Applications
Our general model encompasses standard economic applications of exclusive competition with
incomplete information, as illustrated below.
Competitive Insurance In their canonical analysis, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) study strate-
gic competition between insurance companies for the exclusive right to serve a customer. The
customer faces a binary risk on her endowment w ∈ {wL,wH}, with probabilities (p,1− p) that
constitute her private information. Her (expected) payoff is pu(wL +dL)+ (1− p)u(wH +dH),
with (dL,dH) ∈ R2 being the state-contingent transfers issued by the company she trades with,
which guarantees that Assumption S-u is satisfied. Insurers are restricted to post incentive com-
patible (deterministic) mechanisms. The model of this section can hence be interpreted in terms
of competitive insurance by letting I = 1, ω≡ (p,1− p) and γ˜ j : Ω×{Y,N}→ R2.
Competitive Search The model above has been subsequently extended to analyze the interac-
tion between pricing and trading probability. Specifically, Inderst and Wambach (2002) study
a competitive market in which privately informed consumers apply to firms who face capacity
constraints, and may therefore end up being rationed. The competitive search literature endo-
geneizes rationing as a byproduct of search frictions and bilateral matching (Guerrieri et al.
(2010)). Under competitive search, principals simultaneously post mechanisms and each agent
applies to at most one of them. The ratio between the number of principals posting a given
mechanism γ and the number of agents applying for it determines the rationing probability µ(γ),
which every agent takes as given. If an agent is not rationed, she gets her exogenous reser-
vation utility. For a given application decision, each agent’s payoff therefore only depends on
the mechanism she applies for and on the corresponding rationing probability. Our Assumption
S-u is hence satisfied if we interpret an application decision as our participation choice. On the
principals’ side, attention is restricted to incentive compatible mechanisms that are contingent
on agents’ reported types and, possibly, on their application decisions.
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Competing Auctions In a seminal paper, McAfee (1993) analyzes sellers who compete over
auctions when buyers’ valuation constitute their private information. Peters (1997) shows that in
a decentralized market with many sellers and buyers, second-price auctions arise as equilibrium
mechanisms. In these settings, sellers simultaneously and anonymously post their reservation
prices and buyers choose at most one auction to participate in. A seller and the buyers who
participate in his auction form an isolated corporation, hence Assumption S-u is satisfied. In
addition, sellers are restricted to post direct mechanisms, asking each buyer i ∈ I to report her
valuation vi ∈ [0,1]. A strategy for seller j is a mechanism γ˜ j :
∣∣I j∣∣× [0,1]|I j| → R, where
I j ⊆ I is the set of buyers that participate in auction j. A pure strategy for buyer i is a mapping
λi : Γ1× ...×ΓJ × [0,1]→ Ai× [0,1]×R+, with Γ j being set of second-price auctions for j ∈
J. Given her participation decision, it is always a dominant strategy for each of the buyers
to truthfully report ther private valuations. The model of this section therefore adapts to the
competing auctions settings of Peters (1997), Peters and Severinov (1997), Burguet and Sakovics
(1999), Viràg (2010), Han (2014), Peck (2015).
Despite its large domain of applicability, our model does not incorporate the effects of in-
troducing exclusive contracts in contexts in which agents’ participation choices are unrestricted.
This last feature indeed implies that such settings (see for instance O’Brien and Shaffer (1997)
and Bernheim and Whinston (1998)) do not typically satisfy Assumption S-u.
3 The multi-agent case
This section analyzes the role of incentive compatible mechanisms in games with several agents.
3.1 Failure of the revelation principle
We first show a negative result: there exist pure strategy equilibrium outcomes of GΓ that cannot
be supported in any truth-telling equilibrium of GD. The result is established in a complete
information context, in which agents’ preferences satisfy Assumption S-u, and there is no direct
externality between principals. It provides an instance of the failure of the revelation principle
in multi-agent games of exclusive competition.
Example 1 Let I = J = 2 and Ω1 = Ω2 = {ω}. In addition, take X1 = {x11,x12} and X2 =
{x21,x22} to be the decision sets of principal 1 (P1) and 2 (P2). Let A1 = A2 = {Y N,NY,NN},
with Y N denoting the agent’s decision to accept the offer of P1 and reject that of P2. Payoffs
are represented in the matrix below, in which agents decide in the external box and principals
decide in the internal 2x2 cells. Each array represents the payoffs to P1, P2, agent 1 (A1) and
agent 2 (A2), respectively.
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Y N NY NN
x21 x22 x21 x22 x21 x22
Y N x11 (0,0,5,12) (0,0,5,12) x11 (0,8,5,12) (0,10,5,8) x11 (0,0,5,0) (0,0,5,0)
x12 (0,0,10,4) (0,0,10,4) x12 (0,8,10,12) (0,10,10,8) x12 (0,0,10,0) (0,0,10,0)
x21 x22 x21 x22 x21 x22
NY x11 (0,0,2,10) (0,0,1,10) x11 (0,0,2,12) (0,0,1,8) x11 (0,0,2,0) (0,0,1,0)
x12 (0,0,2,5) (0,0,1,5) x12 (0,0,2,12) (0,0,1,8) x12 (0,0,2,0) (0,0,1,0)
x21 x22 x21 x22 x21 x22
NN x11 (0,0,0,10) (0,0,0,10) x11 (0,8,0,12) (0,10,0,8) x11 (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0)
x12 (0,0,0,5) (0,0,0,5) x12 (0,8,0,12) (0,10,0,8) x12 (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0)
Consider the game GΓ in which M1j = M
2
j = {s,s′} for j = 1,2 and the array of mechanisms
(γ1,γ2) such that:
γ1(m1,a1) =
{
x12 if at least one agent participates and only one s is received
x11 otherwise
γ2(m2,a2) =

x22 if only one agent participates sending s
or if both agents participate and A1 sends s′
x21 otherwise
These mechanisms are part of an equilibrium in GΓ. Indeed, they induce the following continu-
ation game between agents:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY s NY s′ NN
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8) (10,12) (10,0)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8) (5,12) (5,0)
NY s (1,5) (1,10) (2,12) (2,12) (1,0)
NY s′ (2,5) (2,10) (1,8) (1,8) (2,0)
NN (0,5) (0,10) (0,8) (0,12) (0,0)
in which Y Ns represents the decision to accept the proposal of P1 and to report him the message
s.5 The game admits only one equilibrium: A1 playing Y Ns and A2 playing NY s′. The corre-
sponding decisions are (x12,x21) which induce the outcome (0,8,10,12). Since P1’s payoff is
constantly equal to zero, posting γ1 is optimal for him. We only need to prove that P2 has no
profitable deviations.
Suppose first that he deviates to a stochastic take-it or leave-it offer. This corresponds to a
probability distribution over (x21,x22), which we denote (α,1−α). Following such deviation,
the continuation game among agents is:
5For the sake of notation, we choose not to represent the empty messages of the agents’ that are implied by a
rejection decision, N.
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Y Ns Y Ns′ NY NN
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α) (10,0)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α) (5,0)
NY (1+α,5) (1+α,10) (1+α,8+4α) (1+α,0)
NN (0,5) (0,10) (0,8+4α) (0,0)
Since NY and NN are strictly dominated for A1, and NN is strictly dominated for A2, the game
reduces to:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α)
This game has only one equilibrium, in which A1 randomizes over (Y Ns,Y Ns′)with probabilities(1+α
2 ,
1−α
2
)
and A2 randomizes over (Y Ns,NY ) with probabilities
(1
2 ,
1
2
)
. The payoff to P2 is
1
2(10−2α)< 8 for every α ∈ [0,1). Any such deviation is hence unprofitable.
Consider now a deviation towards a general stochastic mechanism γ ′2 that associates a prob-
ability distribution over (x21,x22) to every array of agents’ messages and participation choices:
γ ′2 (s, /0,Y,N) = (α1,1−α1),
γ ′2 (s′, /0,Y,N) = (α2,1−α2),
γ ′2 ( /0,s,N,Y ) = (α3,1−α3),
γ ′2 ( /0,s′,N,Y ) = (α4,1−α4),
γ ′2 (s,s′,Y,Y ) = (α5,1−α5),
γ ′2 (s,s,Y,Y ) = (α6,1−α6),
γ ′2 (s′,s,Y,Y ) = (α7,1−α7),
γ ′2 (s′,s′,Y,Y ) = (α8,1−α8),
with αk denoting the probability of x21 for k = 1,2, ...,8. The agents’ continuation game is:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY s NY s′ NN
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α3) (10,8+4α4) (10,0)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α3) (5,8+4α4) (5,0)
NY s (1+α1,5) (1+α1,10) (1+α6,8+4α6) (1+α5,8+4α5) (1+α1,0)
NY s′ (1+α2,5) (1+α2,10) (1+α7,8+4α7) (1+α8,8+4α8) (1+α2,0)
NN (0,5) (0,10) (0,8+4α) (0,8+4α) (0,0)
which, by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, reduces to:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY s NY s′
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α3) (10,8+4α4)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α3) (5,8+4α4)
Once again, this game exhibits a unique mixed strategy equilibrium, which yields to P2 a payoff
strictly lower than 8.
Consider now the game GD. A direct mechanism for P1 maps the agents’ participation choices
into lotteries on X1 and can be represented as follows:
γ˜1 (Y,N) = (δ1,1−δ1),
γ˜1 (N,Y ) = (δ2,1−δ2),
γ˜1 (Y,Y ) = (δ3,1−δ3),
γ˜1 (N,N) = (δ4,1−δ4),
with δk denoting the probability of x11 for k = 1,2,3,4. Observe that to support the outcome
(0,8,10,12) at equilibrium, A1 must participate with P1 with probability one, and γ˜1 (Y, .) must
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select x12 with probability one. That is, δ1 = δ3 = 0. Suppose then that P2 chooses the lot-
tery (α,1−α) over x21 and x22, irrespective of the agents’ participation choices. The agents’
continuation game is:
Y N NY NN
Y N (10,4) (10,8+4α) (10,0)
NY (1+α,5+5δ2) (1+α,8+4α) (1+α,0)
NN (0,5+5δ4) (0,8+4α) (0,0)
which, by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, admits only one Nash equilib-
rium: A1 choosing Y N, and A2 choosing NY . The corresponding payoff to P2 is 10− 2α > 8
for every α ∈ [0,1).
In the example every principal plays a pure strategy at equilibrium and, following every princi-
pal’s deviation, agents coordinate on a (unique) mixed strategy equilibrium in the continuation
game. Each agent’s randomization over participation and communication decisions therefore
serves the role of a threat. Indeed, direct mechanisms turn out not to be flexible enough to repro-
duce all these threats, leaving room for the existence of profitable deviations for some principals.
3.2 Incentive compatible mechanisms and robust equilibria
The previous analysis shows that incentive compatible mechanisms fail to sustain all possible
equilibrium outcomes even in standard exclusive competition settings. Yet, an important ques-
tion from the viewpoint of economic applications is whether outcomes supported by incentive
compatible mechanisms survive to a principal deviating towards general indirect mechanisms.
A positive answer to this question would provide some foundation for the standard restriction to
incentive compatible mechanisms made in economic applications.
Proposition 1 Let
(
γ˜, λ˜
)
be a pure strategy truth-telling equilibrium in the game GD. Then, un-
der Assumption S-u, the corresponding outcome can be supported in a pure strategy equilibrium
of any communication game GΓ.
Proof. Consider the game GD. Let V˜j and U˜ i be the equilibrium payoffs for every principal
j ∈ J and every agent i ∈ I supported by the incentive compatible mechanisms γ˜= (γ˜ j, γ˜− j) and
by the agents’ truth-telling strategies λ˜=
(
λ˜i, λ˜−i
)
. The proof is developed by contradiction.
We fix an arbitrary game GΓ and extend the continuation equilibrium λ˜ in GD to all profile
of mechanisms in GΓ as follows. First, we let
λi
(
γ,ωi
)
= λ˜i
(
γ,ωi
) ∀i,∀ωi and ∀γ ∈ ΓD ⊆ Γ. (1)
That is, for every mechanism in ΓD agents take the same participation and communication de-
cisions that they were taking at the original equilibrium of GD, in the "enlarged" game in which
all mechanisms are feasible. Next, for all γ ∈ Γ \ ΓD, we let agents select any continuation
equilibrium. Denote λ= (λi,λ−i) the corresponding profile of agents’ strategies.
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Assume now that principal j has a profitable deviation γ ′j ∈ Γ j. Then, it must be that
Vj
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,λ
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
))≡V ′j > V˜j,
in which λ
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
)
is the array of agents’ communication and participation behaviours at the
continuation equilibrium induced by
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
)
. Necessarily, γ ′j 6∈ ΓDj otherwise
(
γ˜, λ˜
)
would
not be an equilibrium in GD. For any such γ ′j ∈ Γ j \ΓDj , we construct an equivalent incentive
compatible mechanism for principal j yielding exactly the payoff V ′j . To start with, observe that
for each typeωi of each agent i, λi
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi
)
∈∆(Si) represents the vector of joint probability
distributions over communication and participation induced by
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
)
. Its j-th element can
be written as
λij
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω
i)= µ ij (mij ∣∣aij,γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi )×pi ij (aij|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) ,
in which µ ij
(
.
∣∣∣aij,γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) is the conditional probability distribution over messages and
pi ij
(
.
∣∣∣γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) the probability distribution over participation with principal j. We now con-
struct the direct mechanism γ˜ ′j as follows: for every a j = (a1j , . . . ,aIj) and for every ω,
γ˜ ′j (ω,a j) =
∫
M j
(
Π
i∈I
µ ij
(
mij
∣∣aij,γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi )) γ ′j (m j,a j) dm j. (2)
The mechanism γ˜ ′j determines a probability distribution over principal j’s decisions which in-
corporates agents’ equilibrium strategies over communication, for every vector of participation
decisions a j.6 Given Assumption S-u, the mechanism chosen by principal j does not affect the
communication behavior of those agents who do not participate with him. Thus, as long as ev-
ery agent i who participates with principal j behaves truthfully, the mechanism γ˜ ′j reproduces the
same probability distribution over principal j’s decisions induced by the equilibrium strategy λ
for a given a j. It follows from Myerson (1982) that, given the mechanisms
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
)
, it is a best
reply for each agent to truthfully reveal her type to principal j, when she participates with him.
Considering agents’ participation, we show that pi ij(.|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) is part of agent i equilibrium
behaviour. By definition of piij, it must be that∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i)≥
≥
∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi′ i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i)
6For those aij which are not in the support of λ
i, we let µij select an arbitrary message in M
i
j.
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for all pi′ i(.|.), given pi−i (.|.), (γ ′j , γ˜− j) and ω. Following (2), we get∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i)≥
≥
∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi′ i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i) .
That is,
(
pii,pi−i
)
are part of a continuation equilibrium in GD. Given (1) and (2), from the view
point of principal j,
Vj
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j, λ˜
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
))
=V ′j > V˜j,
which contradicts that
(
γ˜, λ˜
)
is an equilibrium in GD.
The proposition provides an intuitive robustness result for truth-telling equilibrium outcomes
in settings with multiple agents. Two features are key. The first is Assumption S-u. If this as-
sumption is violated, then each principal can make a strategic use of the messages sent by his
agents to his competitors, and reproducing such complex interactions may not be possible with
incentive compatible mechanisms.7 The second is that principals play pure strategies at equilib-
rium. Were principals using mixed strategies, agents may hold some relevant information before
taking their participation and communication decisions, based on the observation of the realized
lottery posted by the principals. Hence, following Peck (1997), indirect communication may be
useful for principals to profitably extract this information, in which case incentive compatible
mechanisms would fail to characterize principals’ best replies.
4 The single agent case
We now consider games with a single agent and show that incentive compatible mechanisms can
be interpreted as canonical, once the potential multiplicity of equilibria in the agent’s continu-
ation game is taken into account. That is, for every game GΓ we identify a set of equilibrium
outcomes that can be supported by incentive compatible mechanisms: the set of strongly robust
equilibrium outcomes of GΓ. A strongly robust equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which, regardless of the continuation equilibrium selected by agents, no principal has a prof-
itable deviation.8 Formally, the strategies (δ,λ) constitute a strongly robust equilibrium relative
to Γ if for every j ∈ J ,
Vj(δ j,δ− j,λ)≥Vj(δ ′j ,δ− j,λ ′) ∀δ ′j ∈ ∆(Γ j),∀λ ′ 6= λ,
with λ′ being a continuation equilibrium relative to
(
δ ′j ,δ− j
)
. In a strongly robust equilibrium,
everything happens as if every principal has the power to "select" his preferred continuation
7This would de facto reintroduce externalities on agents’ payoffs whose role is analyzed in the general setting of
Attar et al. (2013). In this case, any principals’ deviation to an indirect mechanism can be reproduced by an incentive
compatible one only if the latter incorporates two-sided communication, as they show in Example 3.
8This notion is introduced in Peters (2001), and extended to multiple agent settings in Han (2007).
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equilibrium both on- and off-the-equilibrium path. Although this notion appears to be demand-
ing, it cannot be easily dispensed with. The following example exhibits a non-strongly robust
equilibrium outcome that cannot be supported in a truth-telling equilibrium.
Example 2 Let I = 1, J = 2 and Ω =
{
ω1,ω2
}
. The decision set of Principal 1 (P1) is X1 =
{x11,x12,x13} and that of Principal 2 (P2) is X2 = {x21,x22}. The agent’s types are equally likely.
If the agent’s type is ω1, the payoff matrices are:
If she chooses Y N
x21 x22
x11 (−5,0,5) (−5,0,5)
x12 (6,0,4) (6,0,4)
x13 (5,0,5) (5,0,5)
If she chooses NY
x21 x22
x11 (0,1,3) (0,2,3)
x12 (0,1,3) (0,2,3)
x13 (0,1,3) (0,2,3)
in which each cell represents the payoff of P1, that of P2 and that of the agent, respectively. If
the agent’s type is ω2, the payoff matrices are:
If she chooses Y N
x21 x22
x11 (5,0,5) (5,0,5)
x12 (0,0,4) (0,0,4)
x13 (−5,0,5) (−5,0,5)
If she chooses NY
x21 x22
x11 (0,1,4) (0,2,4)
x12 (0,1,4) (0,2,4)
x13 (0,1,4) (0,2,4)
If the agent rejects all offers, every player gets a payoff of zero. Assumption S-u is satisfied.
Observe that for ω1 it is a dominant strategy to accept P1’s proposal.
Consider a game GΓ with M1 = M2 = {s,s′, /0}, we show that (3,1,4) can be supported
as a non-strongly-robust equilibrium outcome. To do so, let P1 post γ1 = {x12} and P2 post
γ2 = {x22} irrespective of the message sent by the agent and of her participation decision. Let
type-ω1 strategy λ
(
.,ω1
)
be to participate with P1 for every (γ1,γ2) and to send the message
m1
(
γ1,γ2,ω1
)
=
{
any m1 ∈ {s,s′} if γ1 (s) = γ1 (s′)
any m1 ∈ {s,s′} : γ1 (m1) ∈ {x11,x13} otherwise.
Assume that type-ω2 strategy λ
(
.,ω2
)
is such that she participates with P2 only if γ1 (s) =
γ1 (s′)= {x12}. In all other cases, she participates with P1 sending him the message m1
(
γ1,γ2,ω2
)
=
{m1 ∈ {s,s′} : γ1 (m1) ∈ {x11,x13}}. Clearly, λ constitutes a best reply to the offers (x12,x22).
The strategies (γ1,γ2,λ) support the outcome (3,1,4). We now show that they form an equilib-
rium. For P1 to have a profitable deviation, he must attract both types and induce them to trade
different contracts. Now, following any of such deviations, λ prescribes to both types to partic-
ipate with him and to send him the same message. Hence, the deviation cannot be profitable.
For P2 to have a profitable deviation, he should attract both types, which is impossible given
λ. The outcome (3,1,4) is therefore supported at equilibrium with different types participating
with different principals. The equilibrium is not strongly robust: suppose that P1 deviates to the
mechanism γ ′1 such that γ ′1(s) = x11 and γ ′1(s′) = x13 for every participation decision of the agent.
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Following this deviation, there is a continuation equilibrium in which both types participate with
him, with ω1 sending s′ and ω2 sending s and P1 getting a payoff of 5. The agent’s equilibrium
strategy, however, guarantees that such a continuation equilibrium is not selected.
Consider now the game GD. We show that (3,1,4) cannot be supported in any truth-telling
equilibrium. Indeed, for (3,1,4) to be such an equilibrium outcome, it should be that type ω2
participates with P2, and the equilibrium mechanism of P2 must satisfy γ˜2
(
ω2
)
= x22. Sup-
pose now that P1 posts the mechanism γ˜ ′ such that γ˜ ′1
(
ω1
)
= x13 and γ˜ ′1
(
ω2
)
= x11, for every
participation decision of the agent. Both ω1 and ω2 then participate with P1 with probability
one. Since the agent’s equilibrium strategy has to be truthful, γ˜ ′1 yields P1 a payoff of 5, which
constitutes a profitable deviation.
The result crucially relies on how the agent’s indifferences are resolved in each of the two
games. In GΓ, following the deviation to γ ′1 she chooses the most harmful alternative for P1,
which sustains (3,1,4) at equilibrium. In GD, there is a truth-telling equilibrium supported by
the incentive compatible mechanism γ˜ ′1 which guarantees to P1 a payoff of 5 with the agent
being honest. The example develops an intuition similar to that provided by Myerson (1982) to
show a possible non-existence of equilibria in competing mechanism games. We take a different
perspective emphasizing that additional outcomes may be supported in equilibria that fail to be
truth-telling.
We finally prove that every strongly robust equilibrium outcome can be characterized by
restricting principals to incentive compatible mechanisms.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption S-u and I = 1, every strongly robust equilibrium outcome of
any game GΓ is a truth-telling equilibrium outcome of the game GD.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary game GΓ and suppose there is a strongly-robust equilibrium
outcome supported by the strategies (δ,λ). Denote Vj and U the equilibrium payoffs for every
principal j ∈ J and for the agent, respectively. For a given realization of the principals’ mixed
strategies (γ j,γ− j), and for a given type ω, Assumption S-u implies that the set of optimal mes-
sages that ω sends to principal j when participating with him only depends on γ j. We denote
Mˆ j(γ j,ω) such set. The proof is organized in two steps.
1. We construct a profile of probability distributions (δ˜ j, δ˜− j) over incentive compatible mecha-
nisms and a truth-telling strategy λ˜ that induce the outcomes (Vj) j∈J and U .
Take an array (γ j,γ− j) in the support of δ= (δ j,δ− j), a principal j and a type ω. We let
γ˜ j(ω,a) = pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω) γ j(µ j(m j|a j = Y,γ j,γ− j,ω))+ (3)
+(1−pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω)) γ j(mˆ j(γ j,ω))
for each a. To grasp the logic of equation (3), consider the case in which type ω participates with
principal j at equilibrium, i.e. pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω) = 1. Given the equilibrium communication
strategy µ j(m j|a j =Y,γ j,γ− j,ω), γ˜ j(ω,a) is constructed to reproduce the probability distribution
on principal j’s decisions induced on γ j by λ. Conversely, if pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω) = 0, γ˜ j(ω,a)
reproduces any decision induced on γ j by an arbitrary optimal message mˆ j(γ j,ω) ∈ Mˆ j(γ j,ω).
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Iterating this procedure for every ω, we get a direct mechanism γ˜ j for each principal j. We
construct such an array of direct mechanisms for every (γ j,γ− j) in the support of (δ j,δ− j). Fi-
nally, given δ− j, there exists a mixed strategy δ˜ j that would replicate the equilibrium probability
distribution of principal j if the agent behaves truthfully. The mechanisms (δ˜ j, δ˜− j) are such
that the agent has access to the same payoffs induced by (δ j,δ− j). It then follows from Myer-
son (1982) that it is possible to specify the equilibrium strategy λ˜ in such a way that types are
revealed truthfully, participation decisions coincide with those specified by λ, and the payoffs
(Vj) j∈J and U are attained.
2. We show that if (δ˜, λ˜) is not an equilibrium in GD, then (δ,λ) is not strongly robust in GΓ.
If
(
δ˜, λ˜
)
is not an equilibrium, there exists a principal j and an incentive compatible mechanism
γ˜ ′j such that:
Vj
(
γ˜ ′j , δ˜− j, λ˜
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
))
>Vj
(
δ˜ j, δ˜− j, λ˜(γ˜ j, γ˜− j)
)
=Vj,
with λ˜(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j) representing the agent’s decision over participation and communication induced
by principal j’s deviation, for a given realization γ˜− j of the joint lottery δ˜− j. By construction
of λ˜, it is a best reply for the agent to truthfully report her type to the principal she participates
with. Let us now look back at GΓ. Since ]M j ≥ ]Ω for every j, there exists an invertible
surjective mapping φ j : M j→Ω∪{ /0}with φ j( /0) = /0 for every principal j. Consider the indirect
mechanism γ ′j such that γ ′j (m j) = γ˜ ′j (φ j (m j)) for all m j ∈M j.
There exists a strategy profile λ ′ = (m ′,pi ′), such that the agent uses the same probabilities
over participation as in λ˜, and sends messages which induce the same decisions that are available
with
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
)
. Let this be pi
′
j = p˜i j
(
a j = Y |γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j,ω
)
m′j be any element of (φ)
−1
j (ω)
for each ω, for each γ˜− j in the support of δ˜− j, and for each j. Hence, given γ ′j and any γ− j in the
support of δ− j, it is a best reply for the agent to play λ′ = (pi′j,m′j) j∈J . It follows that, for every
γ− j in the support of δ− j, the payoff to principal j is the same that he would get by deviating to
γ˜ ′j , for every γ˜− j in the support of δ˜− j, i.e.
Vj
(
γ ′j ,γ− j,λ
′ (γ ′j ,γ− j))=Vj(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j, λ˜(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j))
Therefore, the expected payoff for principal j satisfies
Vj
(
γ ′j ,δ− j,λ
′ (γ ′j ,γ− j))=Vj(γ˜ ′j , δ˜− j, λ˜(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j))>Vj,
which contradicts that Vj is supported in a strongly robust equilibrium of GΓ.
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1 Introduction
We study competing mechanism games of incomplete information in which competition is ex-
clusive: contracts incorporate exclusivity clauses and they are fully enforced. Thus, upon ob-
serving her private information and the publicly observable mechanisms, each agent chooses to
participate with at most one principal. Given all participation decisions, each principal-agents
corporation is isolated: the payoff to any member of a given corporation does not depend on any
decision taken outside the corporation. Final allocations are determined by the contracts that
principals independently sign with agents.
Exclusive competition is at the hearth of most theoretical analyses of markets in which agents
hold some private information. This assumption plays a fundamental role in competitive screen-
ing (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)), competitive search (Guerrieri et al. (2010)) and competing
auctions (McAfee (1993)) models, among many others. At the same time, letting firms compete
over exclusive contracts is regarded a convenient way to represent full observability of agents’
trades in the extension of general equilibrium theory to private information economies (Prescott
and Townsend (1984), Bisin and Gottardi (2006)).
Despite the prominent role of these economic applications, we still lack a general charac-
terization of equilibrium mechanisms in exclusive competition settings. Indeed, the approaches
above share the restriction to standard incentive compatible mechanisms: principals commit to
incentive schemes such that each agent finds it optimal to truthfully report her private infor-
mation to the principal she negotiates with, as long as the others do so. However, few, if any,
theoretical arguments have been developed to support this choice. If competition is exclusive, to
what extent one can safely restrict attention to incentive compatible mechanisms? The present
paper contributes to answer this question. Specifically, we analyze the role of the incentive com-
patible mechanisms introduced in the traditional, single-principal, mechanism design (Myerson
(1979) and Myerson (1982)) in competing mechanism games under exclusive competition. We
provide two main results.
First, we show that the restriction to incentive compatible mechanisms involves a loss of
generality. Indeed, we exhibit a pure strategy equilibrium outcome of a game in which princi-
pals post indirect mechanisms that cannot be reproduced by incentive compatible ones. This is
supported by agents’ randomizing over messages and participation following every principal’s
deviation, given the indirect mechanisms posted by his competitors. All such randomizations
serve the role of threats for principals. It turns out that incentive compatible mechanisms are not
rich enough to reproduce the same threats and at least one principal can profitably deviate. The
result suggests that standard models of exclusive competition may fail to provide a full char-
acterization of equilibrium outcomes. This failure, however, only arises with multiple agents.
In the particular case in which principals compete for a single agent, we show that incentive
compatible mechanisms retain full power if the way in which the agent breaks her ties is prop-
erly considered. Every equilibrium outcome which survives to principals’ unilateral deviations,
irrespective of the continuation equilibrium selected by the agent, can also be characterized by
incentive compatible mechanisms. Although being demanding, this restriction is tight as we
illustrate by means of an example.
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Second, we investigate whether an equilibrium outcome supported by incentive compatible
mechanisms survives if a principal is allowed to deviate to general mechanisms. This amounts
to analyze the implications of enlarging the strategy space of a single principal, holding fixed
the behavior of his rivals. We show that any pure strategy equilibrium in which agents truthfully
report their private information survives if a principal deviates to any indirect mechanism. This
provides a rationale for the restriction to standard incentive compatible mechanisms postulated
in economic models of exclusive competition.
1.1 Incentive compatibility and exclusive competition: an overview
We analyze competing mechanism games of incomplete information in which agents can par-
ticipate with at most one principal and their preferences are such that, given participation de-
cisions, each principal-agents corporation is isolated. If competition is non-exclusive, several
game-theoretic examples1 show that incentive compatible mechanisms may fail to provide a full
characterization of equilibrium outcomes. The result, however, crucially exploits the fact that
each agent participates with many principals at a time. If agents can participate with at most one
principal, a potential loss of generality associated to incentive compatible mechanisms is docu-
mented in the literature on competition between principal-agents corporations, building on the
original example in Myerson (1982). This literature models situations in which, although each
agent is restricted to be part of only one corporation, competition is affected by an externality
between corporations: the payoff to an agent of a given corporation is determined by market
conditions, which depend on the behavior of all agents, including those belonging to the other
corporations.2 Martimort (1996) is the first to show how this externality can be responsible for
a failure of incentive compatible mechanisms to be a general characterization device. A similar
insight, though in a more abstract setting, is provided by Epstein and Peters (1999) who con-
struct equilibria in which principals correlate agents’ decisions through messages in a way that
cannot be reproduced by incentive compatible mechanisms.3 To achieve the correlation, they
exploit the assumption that agents in one corporation send non-trivial messages to the principals
of other corporations. In the absence of these externalities, are incentive compatible mechanisms
restrictive? We show the existence of equilibrium outcomes that cannot be supported by such
mechanisms even if every player’s payoff is only affected by the decisions of the members of
her corporation. Such a failure of the revelation principle may be relevant in the light of strate-
gic analyses of markets with incomplete information as discussed in Section 2.2. If principals
compete for a single agent, intuition suggests that one can follow the general logic in Myerson
(1982) and rely on incentive compatible mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to provide a formal proof of this result.
1See, for instance, Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002).
2See, for example, the analysis of competition among manufacturers when their retailers are privately informed
of market conditions. In these contexts, different works investigate the link between pre-commitment effects and
renegotiation (Caillaud et al. (1995)), the rationale behind alternative forms of vertical restraints (Gal-Or (1991)), the
welfare implications of information sharing (Pagnozzi and Piccolo (2013)). See Rey and Vergé (2008) for a survey
of recent results.
3See Appendix A in Epstein and Peters (1999).
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Another key issue for equilibrium characterization is whether incentive compatible mecha-
nisms may allow to characterize any best reply of a single principal to a given profile of mecha-
nisms posted by his opponents. In a framework of exclusive competition and many agents, Peck
(1997) exhibits a negative result. Given the mixed strategy of one principal, his opponent can
post a mechanism inducing a continuation equilibrium which cannot be reproduced by requiring
that agents behave truthfully. This suggests that incentive compatible mechanisms may fail to
characterize some of the principals’ best replies. We identify a role for these mechanisms under
exclusive competition.4 Indeed, our Proposition 1 shows that truth-telling equilibria in which
principals play pure strategies are robust to deviations towards indirect mechanisms. This in
turn clarifies that Peck (1997)’s result fundamentally relies on principals playing mixed strate-
gies. More generally, throughout the paper, and in line with standard approaches to competing
mechanism games, principals are not allowed to condition their mechanisms on those of their
competitors. The recent work of Szentes (2015) is one of the first attempts to analyze the impli-
cations of allowing for contractible contracts in exclusive competition settings. He shows that
equilibrium outcomes supported by “non contingent" mechanisms are robust to the introduction
of contingent contracts, although the latter typically induce equilibrium indeterminacy. In the
light of his first result, one could therefore reinterpret our Proposition 1 to argue that truth-telling
equilibria provide a useful reference point also under very general contracting assumptions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a general model of competing mech-
anisms under exclusive competition and illustrates its main economic applications. Section 3
analyzes the multiple agent setting, and Section 4 the single agent one.
2 The model
2.1 Competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
We refer to a scenario in which several principals (indexed by j ∈ J = {1, . . . ,J}) contract with
several agents (indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}). Each agent i has private information about her
type ωi ∈Ωi and ω= {ω1, · · · ,ωI} ∈Ω= ×
i∈I
Ωi is the array of agents’ types, which is a random
variable with distribution F .
Each principal j may choose an action x j ∈ X j. Agents only take participation decisions,
with aij ∈ {Y,N} being the decision of agent i to participate with principal j, in which {N}
stands for not participating. We take v j : X ×A×Ω→R+ and ui : X ×A×Ω→R+ to be the
payoff to principal j and to agent i, respectively, with X = ×
j∈J
X j and A= ×
i∈I
Ai. For a given array
of agents’ types ω, of actions a=
(
a1,a2, . . . ,aI
)
and of principals’ decisions x= (x1,x2, . . . ,xJ),
the payoffs to agent i and to principal j are ui (x,a,ω) and v j (x,a,ω), respectively.
Each principal perfectly observes the set of agents who participate with him. Communi-
cation is one-sided: each agent i may send a private message mij ∈ Mij to principal j. We let
4Under non-exclusive competition, Han (2007), Attar et al. (2010) and Attar et al. (2013) show that this result
requires demanding sufficient conditions. In particular, under incomplete information, Attar et al. (2013) show that
equilibria supported by incentive compatible mechanisms do not satisfy such a robustness requirement, in general.
They therefore introduce a class of two-sided communication mechanisms to obtain a characterization of principals’
best replies.
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each set Mij be sufficiently rich to include the element { /0} corresponding to the information
"agent i does not communicate with principal j", and to satisfy the standard size restriction
]Mij > ]Ωi for every i and j. Principal j takes his decisions contingent on the array of messages
m j he receives, with m j =
(
m1j ,m
2
j , . . . ,m
I
j
)
∈ M j = ×
i∈I
Mij, and on the participation choices
of the agents. Formally, we say that a mechanism proposed by principal j is the measurable
mapping γ j : M j×{Y,N}]I → ∆(X j). We take Γ j to be the set of mechanisms available to prin-
cipal j and denote Γ = ×
j∈J
Γ j. All relevant sets are taken to be compact and measurable with
respect to the topology of weak convergence. The competing mechanism game relative to Γ
begins when principals publicly and simultaneously commit to mechanisms. Given the posted
mechanisms (γ1,γ2, . . . ,γJ) ∈ Γ and their privately observed types, agents simultaneously take
a participation and a communication decision with respect to every principal. In this incom-
plete information game, a (mixed) strategy for principal j is a randomization δ j ∈ ∆(Γ j), and
δ= (δ1, · · · ,δJ) ∈ ∆(Γ) is a profile of mixed strategies for principals.
In line with economic applications, we model exclusive competition as a restriction on
agents’ preferences and on their strategy spaces. If competition is exclusive, for a given partici-
pation choice, the payoff to any agent i who participates with some principal j does not depend
on the decisions of the principals she is not participating with, nor on the agents’ participations
with principal j’s opponents. That is, agents’ preferences satisfy the following:
Assumption S-u Let I j = {i ∈ I : aij = Y}. For every j ∈ J , ω ∈Ω, h ∈ I j, x j ∈ X j and I j:
uh (x j,x− j,a,ω) = uh
(
x j,x ′− j,a
′,ω
)
,
for each x− j,x ′− j ∈ X− j and for each a, a′ ∈ A such that aij = ai′j = Y for every i ∈ I j.
A strategy for each agent i associates to every profile of posted mechanisms a joint par-
ticipation and communication decision. In a pure strategy, every agent participates with at
most one principal and sends a non-degenerate message only to the principal she participates
with. We let Si =
{
si ∈Mi×Ai : mij = /0 iff aij = {N}
}
be the strategy set for agent i, with
Ai =
{
ai =
(
ai1, . . . ,a
i
J
) ∈ {Y,N}]J : aij = {Y} for at most one j} and Mi = ×
j∈J
Mij representing
the sets of participation and communication decision, respectively. A strategy for agent i is then
the measurable mapping λi : Γ×Ωi→ ∆(Si). Every λ = (λ1,λ2, . . . ,λI) induces a probability
distribution over principals’ decisions. Given γ = (γ1,γ2, . . . ,γJ), we let βλj ∈ ∆(X j) be the dis-
tribution over principal j’s decisions induced by λ, and let βλ = ×
j∈J
βλj . The expected payoff to
each type ωi of agent i is:
U i
(
γ,λ,ωi
)
=
∫
Ω−i
∫
X
ui
(
x,a,ωi,ω−i
)
F
(
ω−i|ωi) dβλ dω−i,
with F
(
ω−i|ωi) being the conditional probability of ω−i given ωi. The expected payoff to
principal j when he plays δ j against his opponents’ strategies δ− j is:
Vj (δ j,δ− j,λ) =
∫
Γ j
∫
Γ− j
∫
Ω
∫
X
v j (x,a,ω) F (ω) dβλ dω dδ− j(γ− j) dδ j(γ j).
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The strategies (δ,λ) constitute an equilibrium relative to ∆(Γ) if λ is a continuation equilibrium
for every γ in the support of δ and if, given δ− j and λ, for every j∈ J : δ j ∈ argmax
δ′j∈∆(Γ j)
Vj
(
δ′j,δ− j,λ
)
.
A mechanism available to principal j is direct if agents can only communicate their types
to principal j, i.e. if Mij = Ωi ∪{ /0} for every i, with { /0} representing no communication. We
denote a direct mechanism for principal j as γ˜ j : ×
i∈I
(
Ωi∪{ /0})×{Y,N}]I → ∆(X j) and the
set of direct mechanisms as ΓDj ⊆ Γ j. We let GΓ be the competing mechanism game induced
by a given Γ, and GD the game in which principals are restricted to direct mechanisms. As in
Myerson (1982), a direct mechanism is incentive compatible from the point of view of principal
j if, given the mechanisms offered by the other principals, it induces a continuation equilibrium
in which agents truthfully reveal their types to him. A direct mechanism γ˜ j can therefore be
incentive compatible for a given array γ˜− j, but not for some other γ˜ ′− j 6= γ˜− j. An equilibrium
is truth-telling if every principal posts an incentive compatible mechanism and agents truthfully
reveal their private information to the principals they participate with, whenever this constitutes
an equilibrium in their continuation game.
2.2 Applications
Our general model encompasses standard economic applications of exclusive competition with
incomplete information, as illustrated below.
Competitive Insurance In their canonical analysis, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) study strate-
gic competition between insurance companies for the exclusive right to serve a customer. The
customer faces a binary risk on her endowment w ∈ {wL,wH}, with probabilities (p,1− p) that
constitute her private information. Her (expected) payoff is pu(wL +dL)+ (1− p)u(wH +dH),
with (dL,dH) ∈ R2 being the state-contingent transfers issued by the company she trades with,
which guarantees that Assumption S-u is satisfied. Insurers are restricted to post incentive com-
patible (deterministic) mechanisms. The model of this section can hence be interpreted in terms
of competitive insurance by letting I = 1, ω≡ (p,1− p) and γ˜ j : Ω×{Y,N}→ R2.
Competitive Search The model above has been subsequently extended to analyze the interac-
tion between pricing and trading probability. Specifically, Inderst and Wambach (2002) study
a competitive market in which privately informed consumers apply to firms who face capacity
constraints, and may therefore end up being rationed. The competitive search literature endo-
geneizes rationing as a byproduct of search frictions and bilateral matching (Guerrieri et al.
(2010)). Under competitive search, principals simultaneously post mechanisms and each agent
applies to at most one of them. The ratio between the number of principals posting a given
mechanism γ and the number of agents applying for it determines the rationing probability µ(γ),
which every agent takes as given. If an agent is not rationed, she gets her exogenous reser-
vation utility. For a given application decision, each agent’s payoff therefore only depends on
the mechanism she applies for and on the corresponding rationing probability. Our Assumption
S-u is hence satisfied if we interpret an application decision as our participation choice. On the
principals’ side, attention is restricted to incentive compatible mechanisms that are contingent
on agents’ reported types and, possibly, on their application decisions.
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Competing Auctions In a seminal paper, McAfee (1993) analyzes sellers who compete over
auctions when buyers’ valuation constitute their private information. Peters (1997) shows that in
a decentralized market with many sellers and buyers, second-price auctions arise as equilibrium
mechanisms. In these settings, sellers simultaneously and anonymously post their reservation
prices and buyers choose at most one auction to participate in. A seller and the buyers who
participate in his auction form an isolated corporation, hence Assumption S-u is satisfied. In
addition, sellers are restricted to post direct mechanisms, asking each buyer i ∈ I to report her
valuation vi ∈ [0,1]. A strategy for seller j is a mechanism γ˜ j :
∣∣I j∣∣× [0,1]|I j| → R, where
I j ⊆ I is the set of buyers that participate in auction j. A pure strategy for buyer i is a mapping
λi : Γ1× ...×ΓJ × [0,1]→ Ai× [0,1]×R+, with Γ j being set of second-price auctions for j ∈
J. Given her participation decision, it is always a dominant strategy for each of the buyers
to truthfully report ther private valuations. The model of this section therefore adapts to the
competing auctions settings of Peters (1997), Peters and Severinov (1997), Burguet and Sakovics
(1999), Viràg (2010), Han (2014), Peck (2015).
Despite its large domain of applicability, our model does not incorporate the effects of in-
troducing exclusive contracts in contexts in which agents’ participation choices are unrestricted.
This last feature indeed implies that such settings (see for instance O’Brien and Shaffer (1997)
and Bernheim and Whinston (1998)) do not typically satisfy Assumption S-u.
3 The multi-agent case
This section analyzes the role of incentive compatible mechanisms in games with several agents.
3.1 Failure of the revelation principle
We first show a negative result: there exist pure strategy equilibrium outcomes of GΓ that cannot
be supported in any truth-telling equilibrium of GD. The result is established in a complete
information context, in which agents’ preferences satisfy Assumption S-u, and there is no direct
externality between principals. It provides an instance of the failure of the revelation principle
in multi-agent games of exclusive competition.
Example 1 Let I = J = 2 and Ω1 = Ω2 = {ω}. In addition, take X1 = {x11,x12} and X2 =
{x21,x22} to be the decision sets of principal 1 (P1) and 2 (P2). Let A1 = A2 = {Y N,NY,NN},
with Y N denoting the agent’s decision to accept the offer of P1 and reject that of P2. Payoffs
are represented in the matrix below, in which agents decide in the external box and principals
decide in the internal 2x2 cells. Each array represents the payoffs to P1, P2, agent 1 (A1) and
agent 2 (A2), respectively.
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Y N NY NN
x21 x22 x21 x22 x21 x22
Y N x11 (0,0,5,12) (0,0,5,12) x11 (0,8,5,12) (0,10,5,8) x11 (0,0,5,0) (0,0,5,0)
x12 (0,0,10,4) (0,0,10,4) x12 (0,8,10,12) (0,10,10,8) x12 (0,0,10,0) (0,0,10,0)
x21 x22 x21 x22 x21 x22
NY x11 (0,0,2,10) (0,0,1,10) x11 (0,0,2,12) (0,0,1,8) x11 (0,0,2,0) (0,0,1,0)
x12 (0,0,2,5) (0,0,1,5) x12 (0,0,2,12) (0,0,1,8) x12 (0,0,2,0) (0,0,1,0)
x21 x22 x21 x22 x21 x22
NN x11 (0,0,0,10) (0,0,0,10) x11 (0,8,0,12) (0,10,0,8) x11 (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0)
x12 (0,0,0,5) (0,0,0,5) x12 (0,8,0,12) (0,10,0,8) x12 (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0)
Consider the game GΓ in which M1j = M
2
j = {s,s′} for j = 1,2 and the array of mechanisms
(γ1,γ2) such that:
γ1(m1,a1) =
{
x12 if at least one agent participates and only one s is received
x11 otherwise
γ2(m2,a2) =

x22 if only one agent participates sending s
or if both agents participate and A1 sends s′
x21 otherwise
These mechanisms are part of an equilibrium in GΓ. Indeed, they induce the following continu-
ation game between agents:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY s NY s′ NN
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8) (10,12) (10,0)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8) (5,12) (5,0)
NY s (1,5) (1,10) (2,12) (2,12) (1,0)
NY s′ (2,5) (2,10) (1,8) (1,8) (2,0)
NN (0,5) (0,10) (0,8) (0,12) (0,0)
in which Y Ns represents the decision to accept the proposal of P1 and to report him the message
s.5 The game admits only one equilibrium: A1 playing Y Ns and A2 playing NY s′. The corre-
sponding decisions are (x12,x21) which induce the outcome (0,8,10,12). Since P1’s payoff is
constantly equal to zero, posting γ1 is optimal for him. We only need to prove that P2 has no
profitable deviations.
Suppose first that he deviates to a stochastic take-it or leave-it offer. This corresponds to a
probability distribution over (x21,x22), which we denote (α,1−α). Following such deviation,
the continuation game among agents is:
5For the sake of notation, we choose not to represent the empty messages of the agents’ that are implied by a
rejection decision, N.
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Y Ns Y Ns′ NY NN
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α) (10,0)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α) (5,0)
NY (1+α,5) (1+α,10) (1+α,8+4α) (1+α,0)
NN (0,5) (0,10) (0,8+4α) (0,0)
Since NY and NN are strictly dominated for A1, and NN is strictly dominated for A2, the game
reduces to:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α)
This game has only one equilibrium, in which A1 randomizes over (Y Ns,Y Ns′)with probabilities(1+α
2 ,
1−α
2
)
and A2 randomizes over (Y Ns,NY ) with probabilities
(1
2 ,
1
2
)
. The payoff to P2 is
1
2(10−2α)< 8 for every α ∈ [0,1). Any such deviation is hence unprofitable.
Consider now a deviation towards a general stochastic mechanism γ ′2 that associates a prob-
ability distribution over (x21,x22) to every array of agents’ messages and participation choices:
γ ′2 (s, /0,Y,N) = (α1,1−α1),
γ ′2 (s′, /0,Y,N) = (α2,1−α2),
γ ′2 ( /0,s,N,Y ) = (α3,1−α3),
γ ′2 ( /0,s′,N,Y ) = (α4,1−α4),
γ ′2 (s,s′,Y,Y ) = (α5,1−α5),
γ ′2 (s,s,Y,Y ) = (α6,1−α6),
γ ′2 (s′,s,Y,Y ) = (α7,1−α7),
γ ′2 (s′,s′,Y,Y ) = (α8,1−α8),
with αk denoting the probability of x21 for k = 1,2, ...,8. The agents’ continuation game is:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY s NY s′ NN
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α3) (10,8+4α4) (10,0)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α3) (5,8+4α4) (5,0)
NY s (1+α1,5) (1+α1,10) (1+α6,8+4α6) (1+α5,8+4α5) (1+α1,0)
NY s′ (1+α2,5) (1+α2,10) (1+α7,8+4α7) (1+α8,8+4α8) (1+α2,0)
NN (0,5) (0,10) (0,8+4α) (0,8+4α) (0,0)
which, by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, reduces to:
Y Ns Y Ns′ NY s NY s′
Y Ns (5,12) (10,4) (10,8+4α3) (10,8+4α4)
Y Ns′ (10,4) (5,12) (5,8+4α3) (5,8+4α4)
Once again, this game exhibits a unique mixed strategy equilibrium, which yields to P2 a payoff
strictly lower than 8.
Consider now the game GD. A direct mechanism for P1 maps the agents’ participation choices
into lotteries on X1 and can be represented as follows:
γ˜1 (Y,N) = (δ1,1−δ1),
γ˜1 (N,Y ) = (δ2,1−δ2),
γ˜1 (Y,Y ) = (δ3,1−δ3),
γ˜1 (N,N) = (δ4,1−δ4),
with δk denoting the probability of x11 for k = 1,2,3,4. Observe that to support the outcome
(0,8,10,12) at equilibrium, A1 must participate with P1 with probability one, and γ˜1 (Y, .) must
9
select x12 with probability one. That is, δ1 = δ3 = 0. Suppose then that P2 chooses the lot-
tery (α,1−α) over x21 and x22, irrespective of the agents’ participation choices. The agents’
continuation game is:
Y N NY NN
Y N (10,4) (10,8+4α) (10,0)
NY (1+α,5+5δ2) (1+α,8+4α) (1+α,0)
NN (0,5+5δ4) (0,8+4α) (0,0)
which, by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, admits only one Nash equilib-
rium: A1 choosing Y N, and A2 choosing NY . The corresponding payoff to P2 is 10− 2α > 8
for every α ∈ [0,1).
In the example every principal plays a pure strategy at equilibrium and, following every princi-
pal’s deviation, agents coordinate on a (unique) mixed strategy equilibrium in the continuation
game. Each agent’s randomization over participation and communication decisions therefore
serves the role of a threat. Indeed, direct mechanisms turn out not to be flexible enough to repro-
duce all these threats, leaving room for the existence of profitable deviations for some principals.
3.2 Incentive compatible mechanisms and robust equilibria
The previous analysis shows that incentive compatible mechanisms fail to sustain all possible
equilibrium outcomes even in standard exclusive competition settings. Yet, an important ques-
tion from the viewpoint of economic applications is whether outcomes supported by incentive
compatible mechanisms survive to a principal deviating towards general indirect mechanisms.
A positive answer to this question would provide some foundation for the standard restriction to
incentive compatible mechanisms made in economic applications.
Proposition 1 Let
(
γ˜, λ˜
)
be a pure strategy truth-telling equilibrium in the game GD. Then, un-
der Assumption S-u, the corresponding outcome can be supported in a pure strategy equilibrium
of any communication game GΓ.
Proof. Consider the game GD. Let V˜j and U˜ i be the equilibrium payoffs for every principal
j ∈ J and every agent i ∈ I supported by the incentive compatible mechanisms γ˜= (γ˜ j, γ˜− j) and
by the agents’ truth-telling strategies λ˜=
(
λ˜i, λ˜−i
)
. The proof is developed by contradiction.
We fix an arbitrary game GΓ and extend the continuation equilibrium λ˜ in GD to all profile
of mechanisms in GΓ as follows. First, we let
λi
(
γ,ωi
)
= λ˜i
(
γ,ωi
) ∀i,∀ωi and ∀γ ∈ ΓD ⊆ Γ. (1)
That is, for every mechanism in ΓD agents take the same participation and communication de-
cisions that they were taking at the original equilibrium of GD, in the "enlarged" game in which
all mechanisms are feasible. Next, for all γ ∈ Γ \ ΓD, we let agents select any continuation
equilibrium. Denote λ= (λi,λ−i) the corresponding profile of agents’ strategies.
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Assume now that principal j has a profitable deviation γ ′j ∈ Γ j. Then, it must be that
Vj
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,λ
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
))≡V ′j > V˜j,
in which λ
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
)
is the array of agents’ communication and participation behaviours at the
continuation equilibrium induced by
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
)
. Necessarily, γ ′j 6∈ ΓDj otherwise
(
γ˜, λ˜
)
would
not be an equilibrium in GD. For any such γ ′j ∈ Γ j \ΓDj , we construct an equivalent incentive
compatible mechanism for principal j yielding exactly the payoff V ′j . To start with, observe that
for each typeωi of each agent i, λi
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi
)
∈∆(Si) represents the vector of joint probability
distributions over communication and participation induced by
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j
)
. Its j-th element can
be written as
λij
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω
i)= µ ij (mij ∣∣aij,γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi )×pi ij (aij|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) ,
in which µ ij
(
.
∣∣∣aij,γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) is the conditional probability distribution over messages and
pi ij
(
.
∣∣∣γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) the probability distribution over participation with principal j. We now con-
struct the direct mechanism γ˜ ′j as follows: for every a j = (a1j , . . . ,aIj) and for every ω,
γ˜ ′j (ω,a j) =
∫
M j
(
Π
i∈I
µ ij
(
mij
∣∣aij,γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi )) γ ′j (m j,a j) dm j. (2)
The mechanism γ˜ ′j determines a probability distribution over principal j’s decisions which in-
corporates agents’ equilibrium strategies over communication, for every vector of participation
decisions a j.6 Given Assumption S-u, the mechanism chosen by principal j does not affect the
communication behavior of those agents who do not participate with him. Thus, as long as ev-
ery agent i who participates with principal j behaves truthfully, the mechanism γ˜ ′j reproduces the
same probability distribution over principal j’s decisions induced by the equilibrium strategy λ
for a given a j. It follows from Myerson (1982) that, given the mechanisms
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
)
, it is a best
reply for each agent to truthfully reveal her type to principal j, when she participates with him.
Considering agents’ participation, we show that pi ij(.|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi) is part of agent i equilibrium
behaviour. By definition of piij, it must be that∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i)≥
≥
∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi′ i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i)
6For those aij which are not in the support of λ
i, we let µij select an arbitrary message in M
i
j.
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for all pi′ i(.|.), given pi−i (.|.), (γ ′j , γ˜− j) and ω. Following (2), we get∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i)≥
≥
∫
a−i
∫
ai
U i
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j,a,ω
i)pi′ i (ai|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ωi)pi−i (a−i|γ ′j , γ˜− j,ω−i) .
That is,
(
pii,pi−i
)
are part of a continuation equilibrium in GD. Given (1) and (2), from the view
point of principal j,
Vj
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j, λ˜
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
))
=V ′j > V˜j,
which contradicts that
(
γ˜, λ˜
)
is an equilibrium in GD.
The proposition provides an intuitive robustness result for truth-telling equilibrium outcomes
in settings with multiple agents. Two features are key. The first is Assumption S-u. If this as-
sumption is violated, then each principal can make a strategic use of the messages sent by his
agents to his competitors, and reproducing such complex interactions may not be possible with
incentive compatible mechanisms.7 The second is that principals play pure strategies at equilib-
rium. Were principals using mixed strategies, agents may hold some relevant information before
taking their participation and communication decisions, based on the observation of the realized
lottery posted by the principals. Hence, following Peck (1997), indirect communication may be
useful for principals to profitably extract this information, in which case incentive compatible
mechanisms would fail to characterize principals’ best replies.
4 The single agent case
We now consider games with a single agent and show that incentive compatible mechanisms can
be interpreted as canonical, once the potential multiplicity of equilibria in the agent’s continu-
ation game is taken into account. That is, for every game GΓ we identify a set of equilibrium
outcomes that can be supported by incentive compatible mechanisms: the set of strongly robust
equilibrium outcomes of GΓ. A strongly robust equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which, regardless of the continuation equilibrium selected by agents, no principal has a prof-
itable deviation.8 Formally, the strategies (δ,λ) constitute a strongly robust equilibrium relative
to Γ if for every j ∈ J ,
Vj(δ j,δ− j,λ)≥Vj(δ ′j ,δ− j,λ ′) ∀δ ′j ∈ ∆(Γ j),∀λ ′ 6= λ,
with λ′ being a continuation equilibrium relative to
(
δ ′j ,δ− j
)
. In a strongly robust equilibrium,
everything happens as if every principal has the power to "select" his preferred continuation
7This would de facto reintroduce externalities on agents’ payoffs whose role is analyzed in the general setting of
Attar et al. (2013). In this case, any principals’ deviation to an indirect mechanism can be reproduced by an incentive
compatible one only if the latter incorporates two-sided communication, as they show in Example 3.
8This notion is introduced in Peters (2001), and extended to multiple agent settings in Han (2007).
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equilibrium both on- and off-the-equilibrium path. Although this notion appears to be demand-
ing, it cannot be easily dispensed with. The following example exhibits a non-strongly robust
equilibrium outcome that cannot be supported in a truth-telling equilibrium.
Example 2 Let I = 1, J = 2 and Ω =
{
ω1,ω2
}
. The decision set of Principal 1 (P1) is X1 =
{x11,x12,x13} and that of Principal 2 (P2) is X2 = {x21,x22}. The agent’s types are equally likely.
If the agent’s type is ω1, the payoff matrices are:
If she chooses Y N
x21 x22
x11 (−5,0,5) (−5,0,5)
x12 (6,0,4) (6,0,4)
x13 (5,0,5) (5,0,5)
If she chooses NY
x21 x22
x11 (0,1,3) (0,2,3)
x12 (0,1,3) (0,2,3)
x13 (0,1,3) (0,2,3)
in which each cell represents the payoff of P1, that of P2 and that of the agent, respectively. If
the agent’s type is ω2, the payoff matrices are:
If she chooses Y N
x21 x22
x11 (5,0,5) (5,0,5)
x12 (0,0,4) (0,0,4)
x13 (−5,0,5) (−5,0,5)
If she chooses NY
x21 x22
x11 (0,1,4) (0,2,4)
x12 (0,1,4) (0,2,4)
x13 (0,1,4) (0,2,4)
If the agent rejects all offers, every player gets a payoff of zero. Assumption S-u is satisfied.
Observe that for ω1 it is a dominant strategy to accept P1’s proposal.
Consider a game GΓ with M1 = M2 = {s,s′, /0}, we show that (3,1,4) can be supported
as a non-strongly-robust equilibrium outcome. To do so, let P1 post γ1 = {x12} and P2 post
γ2 = {x22} irrespective of the message sent by the agent and of her participation decision. Let
type-ω1 strategy λ
(
.,ω1
)
be to participate with P1 for every (γ1,γ2) and to send the message
m1
(
γ1,γ2,ω1
)
=
{
any m1 ∈ {s,s′} if γ1 (s) = γ1 (s′)
any m1 ∈ {s,s′} : γ1 (m1) ∈ {x11,x13} otherwise.
Assume that type-ω2 strategy λ
(
.,ω2
)
is such that she participates with P2 only if γ1 (s) =
γ1 (s′)= {x12}. In all other cases, she participates with P1 sending him the message m1
(
γ1,γ2,ω2
)
=
{m1 ∈ {s,s′} : γ1 (m1) ∈ {x11,x13}}. Clearly, λ constitutes a best reply to the offers (x12,x22).
The strategies (γ1,γ2,λ) support the outcome (3,1,4). We now show that they form an equilib-
rium. For P1 to have a profitable deviation, he must attract both types and induce them to trade
different contracts. Now, following any of such deviations, λ prescribes to both types to partic-
ipate with him and to send him the same message. Hence, the deviation cannot be profitable.
For P2 to have a profitable deviation, he should attract both types, which is impossible given
λ. The outcome (3,1,4) is therefore supported at equilibrium with different types participating
with different principals. The equilibrium is not strongly robust: suppose that P1 deviates to the
mechanism γ ′1 such that γ ′1(s) = x11 and γ ′1(s′) = x13 for every participation decision of the agent.
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Following this deviation, there is a continuation equilibrium in which both types participate with
him, with ω1 sending s′ and ω2 sending s and P1 getting a payoff of 5. The agent’s equilibrium
strategy, however, guarantees that such a continuation equilibrium is not selected.
Consider now the game GD. We show that (3,1,4) cannot be supported in any truth-telling
equilibrium. Indeed, for (3,1,4) to be such an equilibrium outcome, it should be that type ω2
participates with P2, and the equilibrium mechanism of P2 must satisfy γ˜2
(
ω2
)
= x22. Sup-
pose now that P1 posts the mechanism γ˜ ′ such that γ˜ ′1
(
ω1
)
= x13 and γ˜ ′1
(
ω2
)
= x11, for every
participation decision of the agent. Both ω1 and ω2 then participate with P1 with probability
one. Since the agent’s equilibrium strategy has to be truthful, γ˜ ′1 yields P1 a payoff of 5, which
constitutes a profitable deviation.
The result crucially relies on how the agent’s indifferences are resolved in each of the two
games. In GΓ, following the deviation to γ ′1 she chooses the most harmful alternative for P1,
which sustains (3,1,4) at equilibrium. In GD, there is a truth-telling equilibrium supported by
the incentive compatible mechanism γ˜ ′1 which guarantees to P1 a payoff of 5 with the agent
being honest. The example develops an intuition similar to that provided by Myerson (1982) to
show a possible non-existence of equilibria in competing mechanism games. We take a different
perspective emphasizing that additional outcomes may be supported in equilibria that fail to be
truth-telling.
We finally prove that every strongly robust equilibrium outcome can be characterized by
restricting principals to incentive compatible mechanisms.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption S-u and I = 1, every strongly robust equilibrium outcome of
any game GΓ is a truth-telling equilibrium outcome of the game GD.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary game GΓ and suppose there is a strongly-robust equilibrium
outcome supported by the strategies (δ,λ). Denote Vj and U the equilibrium payoffs for every
principal j ∈ J and for the agent, respectively. For a given realization of the principals’ mixed
strategies (γ j,γ− j), and for a given type ω, Assumption S-u implies that the set of optimal mes-
sages that ω sends to principal j when participating with him only depends on γ j. We denote
Mˆ j(γ j,ω) such set. The proof is organized in two steps.
1. We construct a profile of probability distributions (δ˜ j, δ˜− j) over incentive compatible mecha-
nisms and a truth-telling strategy λ˜ that induce the outcomes (Vj) j∈J and U .
Take an array (γ j,γ− j) in the support of δ= (δ j,δ− j), a principal j and a type ω. We let
γ˜ j(ω,a) = pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω) γ j(µ j(m j|a j = Y,γ j,γ− j,ω))+ (3)
+(1−pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω)) γ j(mˆ j(γ j,ω))
for each a. To grasp the logic of equation (3), consider the case in which type ω participates with
principal j at equilibrium, i.e. pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω) = 1. Given the equilibrium communication
strategy µ j(m j|a j =Y,γ j,γ− j,ω), γ˜ j(ω,a) is constructed to reproduce the probability distribution
on principal j’s decisions induced on γ j by λ. Conversely, if pi j(a j = Y |γ j,γ− j,ω) = 0, γ˜ j(ω,a)
reproduces any decision induced on γ j by an arbitrary optimal message mˆ j(γ j,ω) ∈ Mˆ j(γ j,ω).
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Iterating this procedure for every ω, we get a direct mechanism γ˜ j for each principal j. We
construct such an array of direct mechanisms for every (γ j,γ− j) in the support of (δ j,δ− j). Fi-
nally, given δ− j, there exists a mixed strategy δ˜ j that would replicate the equilibrium probability
distribution of principal j if the agent behaves truthfully. The mechanisms (δ˜ j, δ˜− j) are such
that the agent has access to the same payoffs induced by (δ j,δ− j). It then follows from Myer-
son (1982) that it is possible to specify the equilibrium strategy λ˜ in such a way that types are
revealed truthfully, participation decisions coincide with those specified by λ, and the payoffs
(Vj) j∈J and U are attained.
2. We show that if (δ˜, λ˜) is not an equilibrium in GD, then (δ,λ) is not strongly robust in GΓ.
If
(
δ˜, λ˜
)
is not an equilibrium, there exists a principal j and an incentive compatible mechanism
γ˜ ′j such that:
Vj
(
γ˜ ′j , δ˜− j, λ˜
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
))
>Vj
(
δ˜ j, δ˜− j, λ˜(γ˜ j, γ˜− j)
)
=Vj,
with λ˜(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j) representing the agent’s decision over participation and communication induced
by principal j’s deviation, for a given realization γ˜− j of the joint lottery δ˜− j. By construction
of λ˜, it is a best reply for the agent to truthfully report her type to the principal she participates
with. Let us now look back at GΓ. Since ]M j ≥ ]Ω for every j, there exists an invertible
surjective mapping φ j : M j→Ω∪{ /0}with φ j( /0) = /0 for every principal j. Consider the indirect
mechanism γ ′j such that γ ′j (m j) = γ˜ ′j (φ j (m j)) for all m j ∈M j.
There exists a strategy profile λ ′ = (m ′,pi ′), such that the agent uses the same probabilities
over participation as in λ˜, and sends messages which induce the same decisions that are available
with
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j
)
. Let this be pi
′
j = p˜i j
(
a j = Y |γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j,ω
)
m′j be any element of (φ)
−1
j (ω)
for each ω, for each γ˜− j in the support of δ˜− j, and for each j. Hence, given γ ′j and any γ− j in the
support of δ− j, it is a best reply for the agent to play λ′ = (pi′j,m′j) j∈J . It follows that, for every
γ− j in the support of δ− j, the payoff to principal j is the same that he would get by deviating to
γ˜ ′j , for every γ˜− j in the support of δ˜− j, i.e.
Vj
(
γ ′j ,γ− j,λ
′ (γ ′j ,γ− j))=Vj(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j, λ˜(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j))
Therefore, the expected payoff for principal j satisfies
Vj
(
γ ′j ,δ− j,λ
′ (γ ′j ,γ− j))=Vj(γ˜ ′j , δ˜− j, λ˜(γ˜ ′j , γ˜− j))>Vj,
which contradicts that Vj is supported in a strongly robust equilibrium of GΓ.
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